

Discussion of “Profits, ‘Superstar’ Firms and External Imbalances”

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 - ⇒ Low interest rates under autarky
 - ⇒ $NFA > 0$ under financial liberalization.
- Successful calibration to Germany and Rest-Of-Europe
- Provide reduced form evidence on the association between:
 - ⇒ Higher profit share
 - ⇒ Superstar firms existence
 - ⇒ $NFA > 0$

- **Firm size distribution matters:**

⇒ If the most productive domestic firm becomes even more productive home's aggregate profit share increases.

⇒ If the least productive firm becomes more productive the aggregate profit share declines.

- **Imperfect competition + homothetic preferences are important for asset supply and asset demand leading to low rates:**

⇒ Firms that earn rents 'restrict' their production compared to the competitive benchmark, less capital available as a store of value.

⇒ Profits are income. If propensity to save out of profits is high, then higher profits also imply a higher demand for assets.

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My only questions are:

- Why US different than Germany with even more superstar firms but a big-fat $NFA < 0$?
- How realistic are the 'constructed' firm size distributions (tail parameters)?
⇒ Heterogeneous tail parameters in firm productivity distributions alone can generate 70% of the imbalances.

Why Germany and US are different?

This paper: financial markets less developed in Germany than US

- Atkeson et al. (2022): US deteriorating NFA position is linked to aggregate profits, with an unexpected change in firm profitability (time series).
- This paper: SS determinants of external imbalances.
- More important difference between papers: asset demand
 - US can generate stores of value out of the future profit streams. Higher profits of superstar firms are in the stock market; US generates more financial assets than RoW, US is net debtor.
 - German firms are 'closely held', with relatively underdeveloped equity markets and most firms in private ownership; German profits largely accrue to German households.
- Any evidence?

- “Over 70% of firms in Germany are in private ownership, with a majority of these owned by one person. Likewise, publicly traded firms are dominated by insiders, with the top three shareholder equity shares adding to around 45%. ”
⇒ Contradicts ultimate ownership: 40% owned by US multinationals.
- “88% of German portfolio investment is held by German investors.”
⇒ Contradicts ECB-SHS data: most held by mutual funds in Lux.

Direct vs Ultimate Ownership

- Aggregate level databases are based on the concept of residence which assigns ownership of financial flows to legal entities' place of registration.
- The legal entity (which is the direct owner) is often located in a tax heaven or financial center.
- Direct ownership overstates exposure to financial centers and hence overstates FDI and understates exposure of countries such as the US.
- The transactor principle allocates transactions resulting from changes in the financial claims/liabilities of the compiling economy/economies.


Example: a German firm may be owned by a British firm, which is recorded as the direct owner, but the British firm may be a subsidiary of a U.S. firm.

OECD/Direct/Ultimate FO

Country	North America			Western Europe			Eastern Europe			South/Ctrl. America			East/Ctrl. Asia			Total		
Austria	10/	5/	3	80/	88/	89	2/	3/	1	1/	0/	1	3/	1/	1	95/	96/	95
Czech Republic	4/	8/	14	90/	87/	76	3/	4/	5	0/	0/	3	2/	0/	3	100/	99/	100
Denmark	10/	15/	24	82/	75/	69	1/	0/	0	5/	8/	4	1/	0/	2	99/	98/	99
Estonia	3/	3/	3	90/	90/	87	5/	5/	7	1/	2/	2	1/	0/	0	100/	100/	100
Finland	3/	3/	16	96/	95/	78	1/	1/	2	0/	0/	2	0/	0/	2	100/	100/	100
France	13/	25/	25	82/	71/	60	0/	0/	0	1/	0/	0	2/	4/	5	99/	100/	99
Germany	12/	24/	41	84/	71/	53	1/	0/	0	1/	1/	1	3/	3/	12	99/	99/	98
Hungary	5/	14/	21	89/	80/	72	1/	0/	1	2/	1/	2	3/	5/	2	100/	100/	99
Ireland	15/	38/	38	79/	52/	49	-0/	0/	1	7/	8/	9	0/	0/	1	100/	99/	98
Italy	6/	10/	35	90/	87/	52	1/	1/	3	1/	1/	6	1/	1/	3	99/	100/	100
Netherlands	20/	15/	19	69/	75/	59	0/	0/	0	7/	4/	5	3/	5/	17	99/	99/	99
Poland	7/	10/	13	89/	87/	85	1/	2/	1	-0/	0/	0	2/	1/	1	100/	100/	100
Portugal	17/	2/	3	82/	91/	94	0/	0/	0	1/	6/	2	0/	1/	0	100/	99/	99
Spain	13/	17/	33	84/	77/	59	0/	0/	0	2/	4/	4	1/	1/	5	100/	100/	100
Sweden	14/	12/	14	83/	84/	80	-0/	0/	0	2/	1/	1	1/	3/	5	100/	100/	100
UK	32/	20/	28	58/	67/	45	0/	0/	1	2/	5/	9	5/	3/	12	97/	96/	94

- Given lack of data, the paper uses firm size bin from the OECD's Structural Business Statistics (SBS) dataset to construct an index of the thickness of the right tail.
- What is the underlying firm level data?

US Data



- **Very nice and elegant, though provoking paper!**
- It will be great if the author can dig more into:
 - Firm size distribution/superstars
 - Germany private firms ownership